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ew issues in the literature on corporate finance and 
organizational  behavior have received as much attention in 
recent years as corporate governance. In the United States and 
in other countries, there is new interest in how firms’ decision-
making structures are organized, the priorities of these 
structures, and the structures’ effect on shareholders. The term 
“corporate governance” essentially refers to the relationships 
among management, the board of directors, shareholders, and 
other stakeholders in a company. These relationships provide a 
framework within which corporate objectives are set and 
performance is monitored.
In the financial services industry, boards of directors face 
additional expectations imposed by their regulators. These are 
usually expressed in the form of laws, regulations, or guidance, 
and reflect the public interest in safe and sound financial 
institutions. This special public interest stems from the unique 
role played by financial institutions—particularly banks—in 
the U.S. economy: they are an important source of liquidity in 
times of crisis, they provide access to the nation’s payment 
systems, and they maintain federally insured deposits. Yet 
surprisingly, the effect of corporate governance on the 
performance and overall health of firms in the financial services 
industry has typically received less academic scrutiny than it 
has in other industries.
After the thrift and banking problems of the 1980s and early 
1990s, regulators and academics today agree that poor 
governance and poor management remain at the heart of most 
serious banking problems. The record number of savings-and-
loan and bank failures in those years spurred legislative 
action—in the form of the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation Improvement Act of 1991—to strengthen bank 
boards and board committees with the goal of holding them 
more accountable for performance. Supervisory guidance since 
then has further underscored the responsibilities of boards for 
fostering sound bank management. Institutional and 
functional consolidation in financial services—both within 
and across national boundaries—also heightens the 
importance of effective governance.
Accordingly, financial regulators are continuing to increase 
their emphasis on corporate governance as a crucial element in 
promoting sound institutions. Academic researchers, too, are 
stepping up their efforts to add insight to corporate governance.
The identification of key issues in governance is an 
important step toward achieving soundness. This special 
volume of the Economic Policy Review is designed to foster a 
better understanding of corporate governance—particularly as 
it applies to banking firms—among regulators, investors, 
researchers, and the interested public. The contributors to the 
volume, specialists in governance, analyze the topic from many 
perspectives, including law, financial accounting, and financial 
economics. As they summarize and synthesize a vast literature 
on vital governance issues, the authors present a framework for 
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Critical Themes in Corporate
Governance
The volume is divided into two complementary parts. The first 
consists of four articles that summarize the literature in several 
critical areas of corporate governance: the role of the board of 
directors, compensation issues, monitoring by outside 
blockholders (holders of large percentages of stock), and 
corporate disclosure. The framework of these articles follows 
the agency-theoretic literature—that is to say, the literature 
that argues that corporate managers may be self-interested, 
and, if operating independently, could make decisions that 
shareholders consider less than optimal. Boards of directors, 
compensation, and block ownership, according to this 
literature, are solutions that mitigate these conflicts of interest.
Researchers view the board of directors as the shareholder’s 
first line of defense against potential conflicts of interest in 
firms. Accordingly, Benjamin Hermalin and Michael Weisbach 
begin the volume with an analysis of the corporate governance 
role of boards. The authors survey the wide range of economic 
studies that have centered on three key issues: the link between 
board characteristics and profitability, the effect of board 
characteristics on boards’ observable actions, and the factors 
that influence board makeup and evolution. Among the 
empirical results documented by Hermalin and Weisbach are 
the findings that board composition does not seem to predict 
firm performance and that board size has a negative 
relationship to performance. However, the authors observe 
that because little theory exists to accompany the studies they 
examine, interpreting the empirical results—particularly with 
respect to possible policy prescriptions—can prove difficult.
Equity-based compensation and equity incentives are 
components of corporate governance that are of special 
interest to investors and regulators. John Core, Wayne Guay, 
and David Larcker synthesize the broad literature in this field 
and conclude that research on stock-based compensation and 
incentives has generated many useful insights. By the same 
token, they contend that the performance consequences of 
equity-based compensation, as well as of equity ownership, 
raise fundamental questions yet to be answered by the 
literature. For example, the authors find support for the 
proposition that performance-based compensation contracts, 
such as stock options, motivate top executives to enhance firm 
value. However, they also caution against making normative 
statements—such as option repricings are linked to weak 
governance—without fully accounting for the objectives of 
shareholders, the characteristics of managers, and other factors 
that influence the decision-making process.
Some researchers argue that investors with a large block of 
shares in a company have sufficient incentives to absorb the 
cost of monitoring its management team. Others, however, 
contend that these investors could benefit themselves to the 
detriment of minority shareholders. Clifford Holderness adds 
to this body of research by reviewing the empirical literature on 
blockholders in public corporations. He focuses on four key 
topics: the prevalence of blockholders; the motivation for block 
ownership; the effect of blockholders on executive 
compensation, leverage, takeover incidence, and a wide range 
of corporate decisions; and the ways in which large-percentage 
shareholders can affect firm value. Perhaps the most striking 
result obtained by Holderness is that most corporate decisions 
are unaffected by the presence of blockholders. In accordance 
with that finding, the author suggests that large-percentage 
shareholders are not likely to consume corporate resources to 
such an extent as to harm a firm. Thus, small investors and 
policymakers should have little cause for concern—or 
comfort—over the presence of blockholders.
Investors, regulators, and other corporate stakeholders 
value financial accounting information on firms because it 
enables them to monitor the actions of corporate insiders, 
thereby promoting enforceable contractual arrangements. The 
paper by Robert Bushman and Abbie Smith examines the 
central role played by credible financial accounting information 
in the governance of publicly traded firms. Bushman and Smith 
provide a basis for understanding how such information 
operates in an economy, discuss a range of research findings, 
and offer a conceptual framework for characterizing and 
measuring corporate transparency at the country level.
Taken together, these articles provide an essential context 
for the second set of studies in the volume, which focus on 
governance in the banking industry. The results in these studies 
shed light on why banks may differ in their corporate 
governance from firms in other, unregulated industries. These 
differences, in turn, present their own challenges for bank 
managers, regulators, investors, and depositors.
The challenges are first examined in the work by 
Jonathan Macey and Maureen O’Hara, who argue that 
commercial banks pose special corporate governance problems 
not only to managers and regulators, but also to claimants on 
the banks’ cash flows. The authors contend that bank officers 
and directors should be held to a broader, if not higher, set of 
standards than their counterparts at unregulated, nonfinancial 
firms. Moreover, they recommend that the scope of the 
fiduciary duties and obligations of bank officers and directors 
be broadened to address the interests of fixed as well as equity 
claimants. Top bank executives, in the authors’ view, should 
take solvency risk explicitly and systematically into account 
when making decisions.
Kose John and Yiming Qian consider another important 
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incentive features built into the compensation plans of bank 
chief executives. One theory popular in the literature is that 
shareholders want boards of directors to compensate CEOs 
with equity-based plans, such as stock options, because the 
plans strengthen the relationship between CEO pay and firm 
performance, known as pay-performance sensitivity. Stock 
options, however, can motivate CEOs to pursue riskier 
investment strategies. If a firm has debt in its capital structure, 
riskier strategies benefit stockholders at the expense of 
debtholders. This, in turn, gives rise to a debt premium. To 
reduce the cost of debt, leveraged firms are more likely to 
curtail their use of stock options. John and Qian find that, 
consistent with this economic theory, the pay-performance 
sensitivity for bank CEOs is in fact lower than it is for CEOs of 
manufacturing firms. They attribute the difference largely to 
the higher leverage of banks.
Renée Adams and Hamid Mehran focus on the differences 
between the corporate governance of banking firms and 
manufacturing firms. They find that the most significant 
differences relate to board size, board makeup, CEO ownership 
and compensation structure, and block ownership. These 
differences across banks and manufacturing firms, according 
to Adams and Mehran, support the theory that governance 
structures are industry-specific. The differences also raise the 
question of whether they arise more from the effects of 
regulation or from the particular characteristics of banks.
Conclusions and Implications
Several important conclusions—each with implications going 
forward—can be drawn from this collection of studies:
• Thus far, research on the corporate governance of public 
institutions has raised more questions than answers. In 
particular, the causes of problems and the consequences 
of governance structures remain elusive.
• One cannot evaluate the weakness or strength of an 
organization’s governance by examining only a subset of 
factors affecting the governance structure. All corporate 
governance components are ultimately part of an 
interrelated system that determines the value of a 
corporation and the allocation of such value among 
various claimants. Empirical studies and regulatory 
changes need to consider these interrelationships in 
order to achieve their respective goals.
• The components of a firm’s governance structure are 
determined by many factors: by the nature of the firm’s 
assets, such as business risk, real assets, leverage, and 
cash-flow patterns, as well as by firm size, industry, and 
regulations. These complex interactions influence the 
equilibrium of firms’ governance structures and give rise 
to different structures in different industries—and even 
in the same industry. Thus, reforms that do not take into 
account industry differences may not have the same 
intended effect across industries.
It is worth noting that most of the articles in this volume 
were completed before the many 2002 public and private 
initiatives for corporate governance reforms. Nevertheless, 
it is fair to say that the conclusions drawn remain fresh. 
Specifically, this volume focuses on economic or market-
based solutions to a persistent problem inherent in the 
nature of corporations: the conflict of interest between 
managers and shareholders. The recent round of reforms 
and regulations aimed at addressing this problem will likely 
improve the governance of some institutions. However, 
only through an ongoing process can any universal benefits 
of reforms be realized.
It is also fair to say that researchers have further to go in 
explaining how governance works and in advancing the 
consensus on optimal corporate governance practices. Over 
the next few years, analyses of the effects of the 2002 
governance reforms will likely contribute substantially to the 
understanding of corporate governance. We hope that this 
volume will assist practitioners and academics in those efforts.
The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York 
or the Federal Reserve System. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York provides no warranty, express or implied, as to the 
accuracy, timeliness, completeness, merchantability, or fitness for any particular purpose of any information contained in 
documents produced and provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in any form or manner whatsoever.